Abstract. Mission-centric cyber-security analysts require a complete overview and understanding of the state of a mission and any potential threats to their completion. To facilitate this, we propose optimizationbased algorithms that can be used to predict in real-time how an attacker may try to compromise a cyber-mission with a limited amount of resources, based on a model that takes into account potential damage to the mission and probabilistic uncertainty. Two different optimization schemes are considered: one where all the mission data is known a priori to the attacker and another where system identification and a moving horizon optimization is used to produce the estimates based on historical data. Our schemes are compared with real attacks carried our by human players in the 2011 international Capture The Flag (iCTF) hacking competition.
Introduction
Guaranteeing the security of cyber-missions is a complex, multi-dimensional challenge that demands a multi-faceted, strategic solution. The terminology cyber-mission refers to a set of computer transactions aimed at accomplishing a specific purpose or task, such as placing an online shopping order, submitting a paper to a conference through an online submission system, or printing a bank statement at an ATM machine. Cyber-missions typically require a large number of computer services, including encryption services, authentication servers, database engines, web servers. We are especially interested in cyber-missions that go through several states, each of which may require one or more computer services. Cyber-missions are especially vulnerable to attacks because it may be possible to prevent the mission's completion by compromising just one of the multiple services required by the mission, provided that the right service is compromised at the right time.
Cyber-missions are pervasive and can be found in trading, banking, power systems management, road traffic managements, healthcare, online shopping, business-to-business transactions, etc. The disruption to cyber-missions can thus result in cyber or physical consequences that threaten National and economic security, critical infrastructure, public health, and welfare. Moreover, stealthy cyber-attackers can lay a hidden foundation for future exploitation or attack, which they can later execute at a time of greatest advantage. Securing cyberspace requires a layered security approach across the public and private sectors.
In the cyber-mission security domain, the security analyst is interested in making decisions based on the potential damage that attacks can inflict to the mission and also on the probability that the potential damage is realized. To focus their attention and coordinate defensive actions, security professionals must be able to determine which attacks presents the biggest threat and prioritize which services to defend, a problem often referred to as cyber situation awareness. Situation awareness [3] is a common feature of many cyber-security solutions but most of them are fragmented. In this paper, we present a model that can be used to predict how an attacker may try to compromise a cyber-mission with a limited amount of resources, based on a model that takes into account potential damage to the mission and probabilistic uncertainty.
This approach followed here motivated by the need to avoid flooding the security analyst with raw data about complex missions and detailed logs from intrusion detection systems (IDSs). Instead, an automated or semi-automated system should process this data and present the analyst with high-level information about the computer services that are currently most crucial for mission completion and thus most likely to be the target of attacks, based on the current state of the mission and its future expected evolution. To achieve this we propose a relatively general model to describe the damage to a cyber-mission caused by potential attacks. This model can be utilized in optimization schemes to discover optimal policies to distribute attack resources over time and over the different computer services relevant to the mission so as to maximize damage to the cyber mission. The models proposed, need mission parameters that typically vary with time according to complex dynamics, which are difficult to determine in an analytic fashion. To avoid this difficulty, we learn such parameters using system identification of low-order state-space models that are used to make predictions of the parameter evolution for a reasonable future time horizon.
Security competitions are exceptional venues for researchers to discover and validate novel security solutions. The international Capture The Flag (iCTF) [5] is a distributed wide-area security exercise whose goal is to test the security skills of the participants. The iCTF contest is organized by the Security Lab of the Department of Computer Science at UCSB and is held once a year. The Capture the Flag contest is a multi-site, multi-team hacking contest in which a number of teams compete independently against each other. The 2011 edition of iCTF was aimed at Cyber-Situation Awareness and, to our knowledge, produced the first experimental dataset that includes mission descriptions as well as attack logs and the statuses of computer services required by missions [2, 5] . We have used this data to validate the algorithms presented in this paper and show their efficacy in predicting attacks to cyber missions by the human participants in the exercise.
The results presented in this paper were also used in the design of a highlevel visualization tool to help security analysts to protect the computer systems under attack in the 2011 iCTF competition [4] . We are in the process of developing human subject experiments to demonstrate the benefits of using the predictions generated by the methodology proposed in this paper, instead of searching through mission traces and security logs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the general mathematical framework for cyber-security and then describes how one can use classical system identification techniques to identify the completely unknown or partially known time-varying processes. Section 3 describes an optimization problem to discover how an attacker would optimally allocate her resources through all the services as time evolves for two different scenarios. The first assumes that the all the mission data is known to the attacker, whereas the second one uses a moving horizon optimization scheme that estimates this data online to predict when and where to attack. In Section 4, the algorithms proposed are applied to data from the 2011 iCTF competition. Comparison results between how the teams in the competition attacked and the results obtained by the optimization schemes are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section refse:conclusions concludes and discusses about future work.
General Framework for Cyber-Security
This section presents a general framework to model mission-critical cyber-security scenarios.
Cyber-Mission Damage Model
Suppose that the (potential) damage that an attacker can inflict to a cyber mission is quantified by a scalar x PD ¥ 0 that is a function of the level of attack resources u AR ¥ 0 devoted to the attack. The mapping from attack resources to potential damage is expressed by the so called potential damage equation that we approximate by a linear map:
where a IR can be viewed as the zero-resource damage level, and b IR the marginal damage per unit of attack resources.
Whether or not the potential damage to the mission x PD is realized is assumed to be a stochastic event that occurs with a given probability ρ r0, 1s that also depends on the attack resources u AR IR , according to the so-called uncertainty equation that we approximate by a linear map projected to the interval r0, 1s:
where Π r0,1s : IR Ñ IR denotes the projection function Π r0,1s pxq 6 9 8 9 7 0 x 0 x x r0, 1s 1 x ¡ 1, the scalar c ¥ 0 corresponds to a zero-resource probability of damage, and the scalar d ¥ 0 to the marginal decrease in the probability of damage per unit of attack resources. We note that an increase in attack resources u AR leads to an increase in the potential damage x PD [expressed by the sign before the b term in (1)], but may actually decrease the probability that the potential damage will actually be realized [expressed by the ¡ sign before the d term in (2)], which is motivated by the fact that a large-scale attack is more likely to trigger defense mechanisms that can prevent the potential damage from being realized.
The total expected damage y TD to the mission can be found by multiplying equations (1) and (2), leading to the expected damage equation
In the context of cyber-missions that evolve over time and require multiple computer services, the potential damage equation (1) and the uncertainty equation (2) need to be augmented with an index t t1, 2, . . . , T u that parameterizes mission time and an index s t1, 2, . . . , Su that parameterizes the required computer services, as in
where u AR s t denotes the attack resources committed to attack service s at time t, x PD s t the potential damage at time t due to an attack to the service s, and P s t the probability of realizing this damage. The corresponding expected damage equation then becomes: 
Optimization
An intelligent attacker would seek to optimally allocate her available resources to maximize the total expected missing damage. We shall consider here several options for this optimization that differ on the information that is available to the attacker.
Optimization Scheme with Known Mission Damage Data
where U TR denotes the total budget of attack resources available to the attacker. As stated in the following proposition, this optimization can be converted into the following concave maximization. 
The optimization scheme just defined is a concave maximization problem (convex minimization) with linear constraints. The dual problem is given by, One approach that can be used to address this scenario is to assume that these parameters are generated by linear dynamics of the form 
where the tw s t , ds, tu are sequences of zero-mean random processes with variances σ s w . One can then use historical data to estimate these dynamics using blackbox identification techniques. Once estimates for the dynamics are available, one can use online data to predict future values for the mission-specific parameters ta s allowing the attacker to improve her allocation of attack resources as new information about the missing parameters becomes available. Note that one could remove from the (double) summations in (14) any terms that do not depend on the optimization variables.
iCTF Competition
The international Capture The Flag (iCTF) is a distributed wide-area security exercise to test the security skills of the participants. This contest is organized by the Security Lab of the Department of Computer Science at UCSB and it has been held yearly since 2003. In traditional editions of the iCTF (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , the goal of each team was to maintain a set of services such that they remain available and uncompromised throughout the contest. Each team also had to attempt to compromise the other teams' services. Since all the teams received an identical copy of the virtual host containing the vulnerable services, each team had to find the vulnerabilities in their copy of the hosts and possibly fix the vulnerabilities without disrupting the services. At the same time, the teams had to leverage their knowledge about the vulnerabilities they found to compromise the servers run by other teams. Compromising a service allowed a team to bypass the service's security mechanisms and to "capture the flag" associated with the service. During the 2008-2010 iCTFs, new competition designs have been introduced. More precisely, in 2008 a separate virtual network was created for each team. The goal was to attack a terrorist network and defuse a bomb after compromising a number of hosts. In 2009, the participants had to compromise the browsers of a large group of simulated users, steal their money, and create a botnet. In 2010, the participants had to attack the rogue nation Litya, ruled by the evil Lisvoy Bironulesk. The teams' goal was to attack the services supporting Litya's infrastructure only at specific times, when certain activities were in progress. In addition, an intrusion detection system would temporarily firewall out the teams whose attacks were detected. The 2011 iCTF competition is briefly summarized below from the perspective of one team playing against the rest of the world. The 2010 [2] and 2011 [5] iCTF competitions were designed closely match practical cyber-security mission scenarios.
2011 iCTF
The 2011 iCTF was centered around the theme of illegal money laundering. This activity is modeled after cyber-criminal money laundering operations and provided a perfect setting for risk-reward analysis, as the trade-offs are very intuitively understood.
The general idea behind the competition was the conversion ("laundering") of money into points. The money was obtained by the teams by solving securityrelated challenges (e.g., decrypting an encrypted message, find hidden information in a document, etc.) The conversion of money into points was performed by utilizing data captured from an exploited service. Therefore, first a team had to obtain money by solving challenges, and then the money had to be translated into points by exploiting the vulnerability in a service of another team. Successful conversion of money to points depended on a number of factors, calculated together as the "risk function", which is described in detail below. Note that, at the end of the game, the money had no contribution to the final stand of a team: only points mattered.
One challenge with the formulation "one-against-world" is that in the 2011 iCTF game, winning was not just about maximizing points. Winning was about getting more points than each of the opponents (individually).
The game was played in rounds 255 (each takes about 2min), but we only have data for 248 rounds since the logging server was temporarily down. Each team hosts a server that runs 10 services each with its own (unknown) vulnerabilities.
Each service s t1, 2, . . . , 10u of each hosting team is characterized by three time-varying quantities dt t1, 2, . . . , 248u:
-the cut C s t , which is the percentage of money that goes to the team when money is laundered through service s (same values for every team), -the payoff P s t , which is the percentage of money that will be transformed into points for the team that launders the money (same value for every team);
-the risk R s t , which is the probability of losing all the money (instead of getting a conversion to points). only able to attack the services 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9 (similar to the first 10 teams in the competition); and another attacker B that was only able to attack services 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 (similar to the teams from place 11 to 20 in the competition). The "sophisticated" attacker was able to gather with 1987 points, whereas the two other attackers were able to get 1821 and 1721 points, respectively.
The results in Figure 1(a) show that the most profitable services to attack were 5, 6 and 9. The top 10 teams in the competition attacked mostly 5 and 6 because 9 was a hard service to get into. Only the top 3 teams discovered how to attack service 9 and only at the end of the game so they had relatively little time to explore that vulnerability. Aside from this, the prediction based on the optimization framework developed here qualitatively reflect the actions of the good teams. In fact, the top two team in the competition followed attack strategies qualitatively close to that of attacker A in Figure 3 as seen in Figure 5 . 6 Future Work
Our future work in this area is focused on developing analysis tools to explore what-if scenarios based on past data and the structure of the cyber-mission. To this end, we are developing optimization schemes for the defender's possible actions, such as taking a service off-line when the service is not needed or extending the duration of a state that would be unable to progress if a certain service is compromised. We are also developing human-computer interfaces to demonstrate the useful of this type of analysis for security analysts.
